Mobile driver's licenses are designed to be both more secure and more private than physical cards, provided they are implemented correctly. Civil liberties organizations have raised important concerns about how digital IDs could be misused, and these critiques have shaped the safeguards built into well-designed systems.
How are mDLs more secure than physical cards?
Physical driver's licenses can be lost, stolen, photocopied, or counterfeited. An mDL eliminates many of these vulnerabilities through cryptographic protection. Each credential carries a digital signature from the DMV that can be verified instantly. Any attempt to alter the data breaks the signature, resulting in verification failure.
The credential is also bound to your specific device through keys stored in tamper-resistant hardware. Extracting hardware-protected keys is designed to be extremely difficult and typically requires advanced exploitation or specialized physical attacks. If your phone is lost or stolen, the credential cannot be transferred to another device.
Unlike physical cards, mDL programs can support faster invalidation and reissuance through suspension or revocation, or other status mechanisms, depending on the deployment. Many wallets also require user authentication (like PIN or biometric) before presentation, which helps ensure the mDL is presented intentionally by the device holder
How do mDLs protect privacy?
Privacy protection in mDLs centers on selective disclosure, where only the information required for a specific interaction is shared. When you show a physical driver's license to prove your age, you also expose your home address, full birthdate, and other unnecessary details. With an mDL, you can prove you're over 21 without revealing your exact birthdate or your place of residence.
This matters because oversharing creates risk. Every piece of exposed data can be stolen, misused, or aggregated into profiles. Selective disclosure reduces this exposure by design.
What about tracking and surveillance?
Civil liberties organizations, such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), have raised concerns about the potential for mDLs to enable surveillance. If every credential presentation is logged back to the issuer, the DMV could track your movements, purchases, and activities in real time.
Well-designed systems can reduce tracking risk by minimizing or eliminating per-presentation calls to the issuer and by restricting what verifiers can collect and store. Some jurisdictions also add legal guardrails, for example, Utah Code § 63A-16-1202 includes explicit requirements regarding selective disclosure and limits on tracking/profiling, which helps make privacy protections enforceable rather than purely voluntary.
What risks remain?
Digital identity systems carry risks if implemented poorly. Automated ID checks could normalize identity verification in contexts where it was previously impractical, potentially eroding anonymous participation in public life. People without smartphones may be excluded from services that are going digital-only. And if physical IDs are phased out, vulnerable populations risk being left behind.
Responsible implementation requires preserving physical ID options, ensuring accessibility, and designing systems where privacy is enforced by technology, not just promised by policy.
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